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Abstract
The evidence on public health regulation of the unconventional gas extraction
(fracking) industry was examined using a rapid evidence assessment of fifteen case
studies from multiple countries. They included scientific and academic papers, pro-
fessional reports, government agency reports, industry and industry-funded reports,
and a nongovernment organization report. Each case study review was structured to
address strengths and weaknesses of the publication in relation to our research
questions. Some case studies emphasized inherent industry short-, medium-, and
long-term dangers to public health directly and through global climate change
impacts. Other case studies argued that fracking could be conducted safely assuming
industry best practice, ‘‘robust’’ regulation, and mitigation, but the evidence base for
such statements proved generally sparse. U.K. regulators’ own assessments on frack-
ing regulation are also evaluated. The existing evidence points to the necessity of a
precautionary approach to protect public health from unconventional gas extraction
development.
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Introduction
This article seeks to review the existing evidence surrounding the public health
impacts of fracking for shale gas, and the regulation of the unconventional gas
extraction (UGE) industry to safeguard public health. Before we present our
analysis based on the case studies selected for this rapid evidence assessment
(REA), we brieﬂy contextualize current policy concerns regarding regulatory
capacity and competencies in relation to fracking and public health. While we
have a deliberate focus on the United Kingdom in this article, much of the
underpinning evidence and our analysis has global applicability. This article is
organized around three key research questions. We outline the methodology
used and case studies selected, followed by the ﬁndings of the REA related to
our research questions. We then use this to oﬀer an analysis of the U.K. regu-
latory position and speciﬁc agency regulatory perspectives on fracking, and our
key conclusions from this review.
The health and environmental impacts of fracking for shale gas, and the
regulation and enforcement of the unconventional gas industry, are being
debated globally as diﬀerent countries and regions consider the costs and bene-
ﬁts of onshore UGE which includes fracking—the primary focus of this review.
Not all of these debates and the issues raised regarding regulation are addressed
in key U.K. policy reports assessing the viability and desirability of fracking
development. The U.K. government and the fracking industry often argue that
the problems associated with fracking in the United States are not applicable to
the U.K. context and emphasize diﬀerent geology and geography, especially
connected to groundwater. Past industry bad practice is acknowledged, but it
is argued that it was largely a product of inadequate regulation and poor
enforcement in the United States.
A number of problems emerge with such an analysis. First, regulations
and their enforcement vary markedly from state to state in the United States.
Second, U.S. federal agencies such as the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA), the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) have estab-
lished some of the best global health, safety, and environmental standards
although as the case studies reveal, states rather than the federal govern-
ment in the United States have the major role on fracking regulation and
enforcement. Third, the fracking industry in the United States has created
problems in very recent years that confound arguments about lax regulation
and poor industry practice being a thing of the past. These problems merit
full discussion when examining the future of fracking and UGE development
globally.
The focus in the United States is often on mitigating risks in an industry that
already exists. In the United Kingdom, and in Scotland (where there is currently
a moratorium on UGE), more fundamental questions arise about climate
change, energy policy, and environmental protection, and speciﬁcally to our
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concerns in this review, whether public health can ever be secured through
eﬀective industry regulation.
Research Questions, Design, and Methods
The three key questions addressed in this review are as follows: (i) What is the
evidence that eﬀective U.K. fracking regulations currently exist or can be pro-
duced? (ii) What is the evidence that such regulations can and will be enforced to
protect public health? (iii) What are the major regulatory and enforcement prob-
lems regarding fracking?
Our focus on these key research questions is in part because the evidence base
surrounding regulatory design, capacity, and enforcement, and the lessons that
can be drawn from existing practice, have been relatively neglected in the U.K.
context when fracking and its regulation have been discussed. This REA seeks to
redress the deﬁcit. The case studies discussed below provide much of the evi-
dence for our analysis, supplemented by the detailed discussion and references
later in this article. We have organized the article so as to minimize duplication
of material as much as possible within this article, and with the available case
study reviews.1
Methodology
An REA was used for the analysis.
REAs provide a more structured and rigorous search and quality assessment of the
evidence than a literature review but are not as exhaustive as a systematic review.
They can be used to gain an overview of the density and quality of evidence on a
particular issue; to support programming decisions by providing evidence on key
topics and; to support the commissioning of further research by identifying evi-
dence gaps.2
REAs are often circumscribed because of limited time and resources—and this is
why we adopted an REA approach for this article—but these two reasons also
explain their adoption. Problems with REAs include possible bias due to trun-
cating the usual systematic review process, such as excluding unpublished mater-
ial; being less comprehensive than a systematic review; and generating
inconclusive results that may not fully answer questions posed at the outset.2
We found both a very small number of peer-reviewed papers dealing with
U.K. regulation and a smaller number of oﬃcial reports addressing the issue.
With regard to the gray literature, there are very many reports and other docu-
ments not in peer-reviewed journals, available on the web, which have limited
distribution and are produced by organizations whose principle activity is not
publishing. The review may have missed analyses that were useful, a density
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issue, but the quality of the gray literature we did explore was generally poor in
terms of depth of analysis and did not meet our criteria on rigor. However, we
did include two representative reports—one from industry and one from an
environmental group—that addressed some of the core themes of this research.
The search terms and results from the search strategy are provided in Table 1.
The literature search used key words and terms and was not restricted by lan-
guage, country, or time.
Table 1. Literature Search Results.
Regulation Hits
Regulating fracking 0
Regulation fracking 0
Regulating shale gas 0
Regulating unconventional gas extraction 0
Regulation unconventional gas extraction 24
Shale gas regulation 35
Fracking regulation 13
Hydraulic fracking regulation 25
Unconventional gas regulation 24
Control of fracking 14
Shale gas controls 10
Fracking legislation 14
Shale gas legislation 15
Unconventional gas legislation 8
Regulating fracking 14
Regulation fracking 42
Regulating shale gas 106
Regulating unconventional gas extraction 6
Regulation unconventional gas 75
Shale gas regulation 134
Fracking regulation 42
Hydraulic fracking regulation 23
Unconventional gas regulation 75
Control of fracking 113
Shale gas controls 280
Fracking legislation 23
Shale gas legislation 48
Unconventional gas legislation 27
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The papers were each reviewed independently by both authors using the
standard approach (Figure 1).
Papers were assessed for relevance linked to our key research questions using
abstracts and summaries available and then retrieved. Many of the papers and
reports we examined did not cover public health regulation at all but dealt with
energy or economic and business topics. We selected for ﬁnal review only those
publications that addressed either in part or whole the public health dimensions
of regulating fracking from the public health, academic, legal, industry, and
nongovernment organization ﬁelds. We included major government and state
reports and reviews. Because fracking is not yet underway commercially in the
United Kingdom, we drew heavily on U.S. material. We did not ﬁnd any peer-
reviewed or referenced publicly available assessments or analyses of fracking
regulation produced by U.K. regulators and none were excluded. We include
later in this paper, however, descriptions from U.K. regulators of their antici-
pated roles in relation to fracking.
The analysis considers the strengths and weaknesses of each case study in
terms of our three key research questions about evidence of eﬀective U.K. regu-
lation or likelihood of such regulation, likelihood of eﬀective enforcement, and
Figure 1. Rapid Evidence Assessment of Fracking Regulation and Enforcement.
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problems that exist in relation to regulation and enforcement. These are quite
fundamental upstream or overarching questions that are appropriate at this
moment in the development of policy in the United Kingdom. In the United
States, a more detailed approach looking at, for example, staﬃng, budgets, and
resources, or identiﬁed enforcement problems and outcomes could have been
adopted. However, since large-scale commercial fracking is not currently under-
way in the United Kingdom, our current review could not include papers
addressing these issues in the United Kingdom.
The cases examined in the REA were as follows:
1. Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering. Shale gas extraction in the
UK: a review of hydraulic fracturing, June 2012.
2. Public Health England. Review of the potential public health impacts of
exposures to chemical and radioactive pollutants as a result of the shale gas
extraction process, June 2014.
3. Shale Gas Task Force. 1st interim report. Planning, regulation & local
engagement, 2015.
4. Scottish Government Independent Expert Scientiﬁc Panel. Report on uncon-
ventional oil and gas. Edinburgh, 2014.
5. Hawkins JF. Minding the gaps. Environ Law Rev 2015; 17: 8–21.
6. American Public Health Association (APHA). Policy statement on the envir-
onmental and occupational health impacts of high-volume hydraulic fracturing
of unconventional gas reserves, 2012.
7. Environment America Research & Policy Center. Fracking failures: oil and
gas industry environmental violations in Pennsylvania and what they mean for
the US, January 2015.
8. New York State Department of Health. Public health review of high volume
hydraulic fracturing for shale gas development, December 2014.
9. Wiseman HJ. The capacity of states to govern shale gas development risks.
Environ Sci Technol 2014; 48: 8376–8387.
10. Small M, et al. Risks and risk governance in unconventional shale gas.
Environ Sci Technol 2014: 48: 8289–8297.
11. UKOOG. Guidelines for addressing public health in environmental impact assess-
ment for onshore oil and gas. United Kingdom Onshore Oil and Gas, 2015.
12. Cook JJ. Who’s regulating who? Fracking policy in Colorado, Wyoming,
and Louisiana. Environ Pract 2014; 16: 102–112.
13. Bomberg E. Shale governance in the European Union. Issues Energy
Environ Policy, 15 October 2014.
14. Centner TJ. Oversight of shale gas production in the United States and the
disclosure of toxic substances. Resourc Policy 2013; 233–240.
15. Centner TJ and O’Connell LK. Unﬁnished business in the regulation of
shale gas production in the United States. Sci Total Environ 2014; 476–
477: 359–367.
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REA Questions and Findings
Evidence That Effective U.K. Fracking Regulations Currently Exist or
Can Be Produced in the Future
Although several reports and papers, including some from the U.K. government
and its agencies, state that fracking would be safe assuming there is or will be
industry best practice and ‘‘robust’’ regulation (Case Studies 1–4, 10, and 11),
the evidence base for such statements is remarkably sparse (Case Study 5).
Government and agency reports and other papers fail to reference any evidence
at all to support their regulatory and industry practice assessments, and no
substantial evidence was available to support such a conclusion. The fact that
eﬀective regulation does not yet exist is clearly recognized in some case studies,
as is the necessity of on-going monitoring of airborne health risks to ‘‘inform
regulation of each phase of operation’’ (Case Study 2). There is some recognition
of the impact of political and industry inﬂuence on existing regulatory structures
and enforcement environments (Case Studies 5, 7, 12, and 13).
The key question of eﬀective enforcement of regulations in a soft regulatory
regime where regulatory agencies would inspect and oversee what could be
thousands of fracked wells is not addressed (Case Study 4). Claims regarding
eﬀective regulation are largely based on conjecture and prompted public health
experts on fracking in the United States to observe: ‘‘a focus on mostly hypo-
thetical regulatory and engineering solutions may mistake best practices
for actual practices, and supplants the empirical with the theoretical.’’3 Yet
other researchers in the United States were clear that ‘‘the sheer number and
severity of risks posed by fracking operations make constructing an adequate
regulatory regime—much less enforcing it at thousands of wells and other
sites—implausible’’ (Case Study 7). This conclusion on the public health
threat from fracking is echoed by U.K. researchers.4 It would also be wrong
to automatically assume that the United Kingdom has better regulatory struc-
tures, better laws, and better agencies with more resources than, for example, the
EPA and NIOSH in the United States. Yet even with an improved regulatory
system and supposedly industry best practice, the most detailed well-informed
and lengthy study on the health impacts of fracking concluded the industry
should not be permitted (Case Study 8).
There is confusion too in several U.K. reports about the technology under-
pinning shale gas extraction, which is new and may be conducted in new areas,
not always in coal mining districts. Case Study 1 highlighted the lack of know-
ledge about unconventional gas and groundwater contaminants and the need for
more surveys, while another was clear that ‘‘fracking must be recognized and
regulated as a new and uncertain technology’’ (Case Study 5). The capacity of
regulators to deal with the new UGE industry over similar periods of time to the
conventional gas and oil industry is inevitably speculative. An industry-funded
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report has cast doubt on the capacity of the various agencies now responsible for
onshore gas development to work together to ensure eﬀective regulation (Case
Study 3), a problem well illustrated by the lack of clarity that exists on waste
disposal (Case Study 1). One trenchant analysis written by a legal scholar indi-
cated signiﬁcant problems with current regulations:
‘‘The very way in which the risks have been assessed assumes that a ‘robust’ regu-
latory system will be in place; this has fed the justiﬁcation for signiﬁcant instances
of regulatory inaction. Clearly the current regulation is not ‘robust’, and the fram-
ing of such risks as ‘low’ based on this assumption highlights the deﬁciencies in this
cyclic determination’’ and ‘‘maintenance of the current approach is beneﬁcial in
that it requires minimal eﬀort and expenditure, whilst allowing the shale gas indus-
try to develop. However, it risks allowing regulatory gaps to remain until problems
materialize.’’ (Case Study 5)
Some case studies did not have terms of reference tied directly to regulation
although they commented on regulatory suitability. Other case studies did not
consider all the issues raised by fracking that require regulation: for example,
climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, sustainable use of water resources,
nuisance issues, traﬃc (apart from vehicle exhaust emissions), occupational
health, visual impact, and the socioeconomic beneﬁts and impacts of shale gas
extraction (see for example Case Study 2). Case Study 3 identiﬁes a range of
failings with the existing regulatory, monitoring, and self-monitoring systems
that indicate it is impossible to guarantee the current regulatory system can deal
eﬀectively with the health, safety, and environmental challenges posed by fracking.
Reconciling this assessment with the view that ‘‘considerable legislative safeguards’’
already exist to prevent adverse UGE impacts is problematic, notwithstanding the
admission that ‘‘confusion has been expressed about the regulatory framework and
a lack of conﬁdence in the regulatory regime’’ (Case Study 4).
Evidence That Such Regulations Can and Will Be Enforced to Protect
Public Health
Some case studies contained no public health experts, no legal specialists, no
members who had independent research expertise in assessing regulation, or no
independent members with research expertise in assessing this industry’s health,
safety, and environmental performance (Case Study 1, 3, 4, and 11).
The budgets, resources, and staﬃng of the key central and local governmental
agencies and departments dealing with fracking-related issues in the United
Kingdom have been cut—a trend that in some instances predates the latest
economic crisis. The need for increased regulatory capacity and regulator
cooperation, highlighting the potential problems with well inspection and the
need for more independent veriﬁcation is recognized (Case Study 1). The
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important and complex settings within which regulation will be made attracts
some attention (Case Study 13), a matter arguably likely to be exacerbated with
‘‘Brexit,’’ the term used for the U.K. government’s decision to leave the
European Union (EU), recently approved by the U.K. Parliament, which may
entail the U.K. Parliament changing regulations relating to fracking and deviat-
ing from existing EU environmental standards and guidance.
There is therefore a regulatory deﬁcit in the U.K. relating to the infrastructure
needed to ensure eﬀective oversight of existing industrial activities. If fracking is
permitted across the United Kingdom, then potentially many thousands of wells
will be developed. Planning staﬀ and local environmental health professionals
who may play key roles in approving or monitoring large numbers of fracked
wells and the communities around them are already under substantial pressure
and lack capacity. The inspection and enforcement issue is compounded further
by the ‘‘better regulation’’ agenda. It has damaged both inspection and enforce-
ment regimes and appears to be geared towards making regulation better for
business, rather than those social groups who may carry the burdens of business
externalities not protected by regulation. Case Study 1 called for speciﬁc guide-
lines to ensure that eﬀective ‘‘goal-based’’ risk assessments were prepared and
submitted to regulators for both scrutiny and enforcement with compulsory
reporting of well failures.
Problems of inspection and enforcement to prevent adverse health impacts
may be compounded by a lack of data available prior to fracking. It is evident
that not only are baseline environmental monitoring studies lacking but consid-
eration of wider socioeconomic impacts remains a blind-spot. Although the
problem of cumulative health impacts of many wells in relatively small areas
was recognized, it was not possible to establish how this factor played into risk
assessments that indicated fracking was low risk (Case Study 2).
Evidence from the United States has revealed the continued failures in frack-
ing industry practice despite the creation of an industry/nongovernment organ-
ization collaboration—the Center for Sustainable Shale Development.5 This
points to the ongoing problem of enforcement in several states and the dangers
of over-reliance on industry initiatives and in-house industry surveillance (Case
Study 7). There are salutary lessons here for any decision-makers considering
permitting UGE and fracking.
There is also evidence about wider failures of regulators to identify, prevent,
or reduce exposures to a range of past pollutants that now present major public
health problems. Fracking will add to this pollution burden: a fact that high-
lights the urgent need for cumulative environmental health impacts and the
development of metrics to inform exposomes (a measure of all the exposures
of an individual in a lifetime from birth to old age and how those exposures relate
to health). The WHO International Agency for Research on Cancer estimates
7%–19% of cancers world-wide are due to environmental exposures causing thou-
sands of U.K. deaths each year.6,7 Air pollution is now estimated to cause 40,000
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deaths each year in the United Kingdom.8 UGE will be an additional source of
exposures to such environmental and workplace pollutants.
Evidence on the Major Regulatory and Enforcement Problems Relating to
Fracking and Public Health
There are important lessons to be learned in relation to securing public health.
Regulation, experience, and practice elsewhere should inform policy making on
fracking and other UGE in the United Kingdom. Also it is clear that good regu-
lation without eﬀective enforcement is meaningless (Case Study 15). These lessons
suggest a much more cautious approach is required, and that the regulatory
frameworks and capacity must be established well in advance of operations.
For example, after two decades of fracking in the United States, in a complex
regulatory environment, a lack of understanding about some risks persists.
Moreover, there were still regulatory gaps and problems with information and
training needed for enforcement (Case Study 9). U.S. experience also highlights
‘‘current practices and regulations which often do not adequately consider long-
term and compounding health eﬀects’’ (Case Study 15).
The economic value of eﬀective controls reducing public health threats from
air pollution was ﬂagged in one case study, but the diﬃculty of making similar
calculations for water pollution was noted due to lack of information on costs
and risks. Research has noted the failure of some U.S. state regulators to con-
sider the cumulative externalities generated by fracking through air, soil, and
water pollution; loss of water resources; and added health service costs (Case
Study 14). The solution to the problems of estimating the economic costs of
fracking in the United Kingdom is no closer than in the United States. A recent
economic impact assessment report on UGE commissioned by the Scottish
Government barely discussed potential environmental costs, and the variance
in projected economic beneﬁts between high and low return scenarios suggests
much more detailed modeling is required.9
How particular groups can be protected in both regulations and enforcement
practice if fracking occurs is a signiﬁcant challenge. For example, the issue of
exposure of vulnerable groups, and very low-level exposure to endocrine dis-
ruptors, is not addressed (Case Study 11). Crucially, for public health, to protect
vulnerable groups as well as local populations, baseline monitoring, and
data gathering must be ﬁrst undertaken. This appears to be severely lacking
or limited and fragmented in many areas with regard to environmental and
health data (Case Studies 1, 2, 4, and 6). This evidence gathering should then
be used to inform any subsequent decision-making around permitting or licen-
sing extraction.
Monitoring and data-gathering to ﬁll gaps are considered vital to best regu-
latory practice (Case Studies 6 and 14). Yet because of the dearth of data,
the many public health uncertainties of fracking and the lack of peer-reviewed
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studies in certain subjects (Case Studies 1 and 2) mean major public health
problems with the industry in future cannot be ruled out on the evidence cur-
rently available. Proper recognition of many public health-related problems is
not achieved, partly because of the absence or limited input of public health and
regulatory expertise in several U.K. case studies (Case Studies 1, 3, 4, and 11).
One solution oﬀered to a lack of regulatory resources is that industry might
fund regulation through fees and levies drawn from operators (Case Study 3).
Such an approach is in itself problematic as has been shown with a similar U.K.
Health & Safety Executive (HSE) scheme now running, creating tensions with
industry, workers, and communities alike. The approach could also imply regu-
lation would lag behind industry practice. Would industry be ﬁrst expected to
fund regulation and then begin operations? This seems an unstable and unsat-
isfactory regulatory solution, as the independence of a regulator reliant on
industry for its survival would be extremely diﬃcult to establish in the eyes of
other stakeholders.
Several other elements were considered in a number of the case studies that
were either marginalized or taken for granted by other case studies. These elem-
ents were linked to environmental justice, transparency, and meaningful com-
munity engagement. For example, there was a view that a community’s right to
know in detail about the hazardous substances used in fracking, including
detailed toxicity information, is vital (Case Study 14). The legal right of the
public to disclosure of information on fracking ﬂuids, rather than reliance on
voluntary agreements, has exercised industry, regulators, and academics and has
not yet been fully resolved either in the United Kingdom or United States (Case
Studies 11 and 14).
Several studies advocated or noted a precautionary or preventative approach
to future shale gas development (Case Studies 5, 6, 8, and 13), but the detail on
how exactly such approaches could be implemented were often lacking. This
may be because there is a widely recognized problem of applying the precau-
tionary principle in policy domains where the evidence base is absent, emerging,
or contested. These studies largely focus on U.S. or EU cases (Case Studies 5, 8,
and 13). The precautionary principle has many deﬁnitions across a wide spec-
trum. They can include bans when faced with compelling evidence about signiﬁ-
cant harm to public health, or the possibility of such harm when other less risky
technologies exist, or where there are signiﬁcant data gaps about health impacts.
They might also include the use of a moratorium (one purpose of which would
be to allow regulators and policy makers to gather more evidence to inform
future decision-making) or tight regulation (where regulation is very stringent
and designed to minimize potential known risks and externalities). In practice, it
is the precise conﬁguration of tight regulation that concerns many authors who
favor a strong precautionary approach. All these versions of the precautionary
principle have been ﬂoated for fracking and may be interpreted in many ways by
those arguing for or against its adoption.
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It is notable that the precautionary principle is one that has not been adopted
readily in the United Kingdom. A House of Commons Library Brieﬁng Paper
on fracking prepared for MPs in October 2015, touched on and described the
existing regulatory regime, reiterating statements from U.K. government bodies.
No detailed analysis was oﬀered on regulation and the merits of a precautionary
approach were not considered. The brieﬁng re-iterated the conclusions of what it
described as ‘‘a short review’’ of fracking risks produced by the Royal Society
and Royal Society of Engineering in 2012.10 The brieﬁng document did explore
pollution incidents and cited sources that made it clear regulation of fracking in
the United States varied in levels of stringency. This is a point frequently for-
gotten by several U.K. commentators who simply categorized U.S. regulation as
universally poor when it was not. A recent report by Health Protection Scotland
recommended that any future UGE development in Scotland, if permitted,
should proceed with ‘‘relative precaution.’’11 It is a highly ambiguous term
that is not deﬁned in the report, but suggests a greater sensitivity to the problems
associated with fracking and UGE than is evident in U.K. policy.
The Commons brieﬁng also drew on the Tyndall assessment of shale gas
regarding environmental and climate change impacts. The Tyndall researchers
highlighted some issues that are not mentioned in the Commons brieﬁng note:
for example, on data gaps and regulatory problems; they considered at that time
in 2011, ‘‘Concerns remain about the adequacy of current U.K. regulation of
groundwater and surface water contamination and the assessment of environ-
mental impact.’’12 Even with stringent regulatory controls, the Tyndall report
recognized contamination risks could not be ‘‘fully eliminated’’ and their key
conclusion was that
Evidence from the US suggests shale gas extraction brings a signiﬁcant risk of
ground and surface water contamination and until the evidence base is developed
a precautionary approach to development in the UK and Europe is the only
responsible action.12
Specific Agency Regulatory Assessments: The View From
U.K. Regulators
Reports produced by U.K. regulators—the Health & Safety Executive (HSE),
Environment Agency (EA), and Scottish Environment Protection Agency
(SEPA)—were not used as case studies in this REA because they were generally
written as guides for policy users, politicians, and civil servants and hence rarely
engage with or reference independent literature dealing with assessments of
fracking industry practice, regulation, and enforcement. They are not research
reports, and none of the above agencies have produced research reports on UGE
regulation and industry practice. Regulators’ reports tend towards descriptions
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of the agencies’ regulatory and enforcement responsibilities, structures, and
practices, now and in the future. They provide information about application
of existing laws and are self-assessments of what can be done based primarily but
not exclusively on the U.K. government’s early commitment to fracking.
Although some indicate the need to expand or revise legislation to deal with
fracking, they cannot independently evaluate their own practices, staﬃng, and
resources. Hence these agency documents, or assessments by those they com-
mission, are open to challenge. Regulators’ claims, at this stage, to be able to
regulate fracking eﬀectively are simply opinions and assertions lacking in evi-
dence and independent scrutiny. There are additional forces that inﬂuence frack-
ing regulation not least with the ‘‘better regulation’’ approaches recently
adopted by several U.K. agencies.
No publicly available and independent assessments of what the regulators
now do or propose to do on fracking were identiﬁed in this REA beyond
those already included as case studies, but literature on regulation and regula-
tory philosophies provide an invaluable backcloth for the REA and contain
positive and negative analyses of the U.K. regulation.13–15 There are also cri-
tiques of the monitoring and enforcement policies and practices adopted by
various regulatory agencies. Information on some of the regulatory debates
and industry practice relevant to UGE and fracking regulation is available in
the critical analyses done by independent researchers such as Tombs and
Whyte.13,16–18
The problem for the agencies that may be responsible for monitoring and
enforcing fracking regulation is further compounded by the fact that there is
currently no experience of dealing with the on-shore fracking industry at scale in
the United Kingdom. Moreover, the cuts in resources and staﬃng that many
agencies have experienced over the last decade or more raise pressing concerns
about regulatory capacity. The recently published Scottish Government review
of public health impacts of unconventional gas noted concerns among regulators
of ‘‘potential overstretch.’’11 If UGE, including fracking, entails the sinking of
thousands of wells, the public and communities in areas where fracking is most
likely to occur may be skeptical of statements from regulators that they can
eﬀectively oversee such large developments with existing staﬀ, resources, and
expertise.
The role and function of regulatory agencies in various governance arrange-
ments have been subject to increasing scholarly attention over the last twenty
years as partnership and new public management approaches have been
adopted. This voluminous literature is not easily summarized, but can be
broadly located between two key poles. One argues that agencies are largely
independent of government interference and relatively free to make their own
judgements and fulﬁll their functions without political micro-management.
A more critical perspective suggests many agencies lack autonomy. They can
be captured by those they oversee or must increasingly align regulation with
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government preferences.18 There are also several positions between these poles.
The debate about whether precaution or prevention informs regulators dealing
with fracking has been explored in recent years in the context of legal and other
drivers.19 In light of the key ﬁnding of the REA above, a brief commentary is
oﬀered here on how it compares with what U.K. regulators have stated about
their roles and functions, before we reﬂect on the key conclusions that can be
drawn from this research.
Environment Agency (EA)
The EA operates under the Department for Business, Energy & Industrial
Strategy (DBEIS) (formerly Department of Energy & Climate Change
DECC). DECC had oversight of UGE and in April 2015 gave up some of its
functions to the Oil and Gas Authority. The Environment Agency still deals
with ‘‘appropriate permits or authorization’’ for exploratory and production
phases. The Environment Agency’s environmental permitting regulations per-
tain to water resources, and they assess the use of chemicals in hydraulic frac-
turing ﬂuids. The Environment Agency also has a function in respect of
treatment and disposal of wastes produced during borehole drilling and hydrau-
lic fracturing processes. It is a statutory consultee in the planning process, advis-
ing local government on the potential risks to the environment from individual
gas exploration and extraction sites.20 ‘‘If an environmental regulator ﬁnds that
an operator is in breach of an authorization or permit, it will take action to stop
any activity, prevent further impacts and remedy those that have happened.’’15
DECC relied heavily on the Royal Society/Royal Academy of Engineering 2012
(Case Study 1) report and the PHE 2014 (Case Study 2) report to support its
assessment that fracking is safe if well regulated. They assert: ‘‘Before any shale
operation can begin in the United Kingdom, operators must pass rigorous
health and safety, environmental and planning permission processes.’’20 The
oﬃcial guidance does not test if the existing regulations and permitting processes
are adequate and will be eﬀectively enforced by an agency with suﬃcient staﬀ,
resources, and expertise to ensure proper regulation.
Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA)
SEPA has similar responsibilities and powers in Scotland to the Environment
Agency in England regarding fracking and other forms of unconventional gas
extraction and has identiﬁed in the recent past a range of duties and functions
relevant to UGE regulation. It is a statutory consultee in the local authority
planning permission process and in this sphere, has an authorization role regard-
ing exploration wells. Along with HSE and what was DECC, it issues well
consents. Health Protection Scotland may have a role to advise government,
industry, and planning authorities on the public health impacts of UGE.
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In terms of well operations, SEPA will be responsible for the Water
Environment (Controlled Activities) Scotland Regulations 2011, and related
licenses that deal with water abstraction, treatment, and possible pollution
issues; the Management of Extractive Waste (Scotland) Regulations 2010; the
Radioactive Substances Act 1993; the Pollution Prevention and Control
(Scotland) Regulations 2012.21 SEPA also has a regulatory role under the
Control of Major Accident Hazards Regulations 1999 (COMAH) and the
Environmental Liability (Scotland) Regulations 2009 and has ‘‘a duty to con-
sider how Scotland can reduce the greenhouse gas emissions from regulated
industry and businesses, under the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009.’’22
As well as contributing to climate change, fugitive emissions have the potential
to impact human health and the environment.
The regulatory challenges for SEPA relate to resources, staﬃng, and data
gaps in key areas related to UGE that currently exist both globally and within
Scotland. While not as savagely cut as the Environment Agency or HSE, the
impacts of Westminster economic retrenchment policies on Scottish environ-
mental regulation and enforcement are very real. In terms of assessing the like-
lihood that fracking can or will be eﬀectively regulated in Scotland, there are no
independent judgments available. SEPA has repeated its commitment to deliver
‘‘robust and proportionate regulation’’ of UGE23 but exactly what this means in
terms of overseeing potentially thousands of wells in the densely populated
central belt of Scotland for example is not clear.
SEPA has indicated it believes existing staﬀ can deal with any regulatory
challenges they face. However, others outside the agency may not share this
conﬁdence in SEPA’s enforcement activity and practices. There is also potential
for perceptions of conﬂict of interests. For example, the agency has used a
former chemical industry senior executive who worked for a company that pro-
duces fracking ﬂuids, to train hundreds of its staﬀ on how to regulate for sus-
tainability and economic growth.24,25
Health and Safety Executive (HSE)
The HSE locus in relation to UGE, including fracking, focuses on well design,
construction, operation, and decommissioning and borehole regulation.
Occupational health and safety is a reserved matter and so the HSE has respon-
sibility across Great Britain (England, Scotland, and Wales) but not the United
Kingdom for worker health and safety, and related risks to the public from
workplace hazards. It requires operators to ‘‘notify HSE, at least 21 days
before drilling is planned, of the well design and operation plans to ensure that
major accident hazard risks to people from well and well-related activities are
properly controlled.’’26 To what extent HSE could guarantee the necessary scru-
tiny within the speciﬁed twenty-one-day period is unclear. How ‘‘joined up work-
ing’’ with other agencies can be ensured and be eﬀective remains untested. While a
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memorandum of understanding between HSE and the Environment Agency27 has
existed for a few years there is currently no large-scale shale gas production from
fracking anywhere in the United Kingdom. No one knows whether these agencies
will work well together in joint initial inspections, review inspections, and other
regulatory activities. For example, there is considerable uncertainty about how to
ensure eﬀective oversight of fracking chemicals. Currently, the EU’s REACH
directive applies in the United Kingdom, but with Brexit uncertainty, and numer-
ous data gaps regarding fracking ﬂuid toxicity, the challenge facing these regula-
tors on this aspect of fracking regulation alone is considerable.
Much is made by HSE of its established regulatory regime on health and safety
but there is widespread agreement from independent assessors (and even within the
HSE itself) that it has failed to address the longstanding issues with occupational
disease in the United Kingdom. There are legitimate concerns now that such fail-
ures will be replicated in the fracking sector. The position is further compounded by
declining HSE inspections, limited enforcement and court penalties, and the use of
‘‘independent’’ well examiners who ‘‘can be an employee of the operating company
or a contractor,’’ according to the HSE.26 Staﬃng and resources are key concerns.
HSE itself notes they believe they have suﬃcient ‘‘if undeﬁned wells expertise’’ but
‘‘would need to reassess the situation if it [fracking] moved into large-scale produc-
tion.’’26 When considered against their existing national health and safety record,
resources, and staﬀ, there are clear grounds for concern surrounding the capacity of
HSE to fulﬁll its regulatory obligations vis-a-vis worker and public health should
fracking develop even at modest scale across the United Kingdom.
The HSE produced an Onshore Gas and pipelines sector strategy for
2014–2017 in which it stated its main concern was to eliminate ‘‘the risk of
major hazard incidents in which many workers and/or members of the public
might be killed or injured’’28 through ﬁre and explosion risks. Nowhere in the
document does it refer to the need to regulate the occupational disease threats to
workers and the public that might be posed by the onshore gas industry. The
operational regulatory regime is largely business-friendly.
Our regulation is undertaken within a wider context. Whilst we will always take the
protection of the safety and health of onshore gas and pipelines industry workers
and members of the public as an overriding priority, we also recognize that the
industry operates within a complex environment. This strategy looks to encourage
industry cooperation and leadership in a context that supports all aspects of good
business practice.28
The HSE Delivery document linked to this states that ‘‘in general, the indus-
try has a good record regarding the management of conventional health and
safety issues.’’29 The use of regulation speciﬁcally to reduce occupational ill-
health does not feature as something the HSE seeks to deliver. Occupational
health is mentioned only once in the Aims and Objectives document that focuses
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again on catastrophes, rightly a major issue. ‘‘Personal health and safety’’ is seen
as separate and the HSE does not set aims and objectives for the industry
because it considers it has a relatively good record.30
Such an approach downgrades the population and epidemiological approach
to sectoral occupational ill-health. This is reﬂected in HSE’s historic inability or
neglect over recent decades, to take national regulatory and enforcement action
on occupational diseases. Identiﬁed on-shore gas and oil pipeline issues
are conﬁned for example to concerns about hand-arm vibration whereas it is
clear that on-shore gas presents many more occupational health challenges. If
on-shore fracking develops on a large scale, the range of occupational health
concerns will likely mirror those reported and documented in places where the
industry is already operating.
Regulators need to know all of the hazards and related risks to check for,31–33 all
the substances thatmay be used and their interactions in the fracking process and in
the wider environment,33–37 all the pathways that may exist around each well along
which those substances and pollutants may travel,32,38,39 and what known and
potential adverse health ill-eﬀects, including on mental health and well-being,
may result from such exposures.34,39–47 If data gaps exist in these ﬁelds, they
should be noted. It is clear from peer-reviewed research papers and reports pub-
lished during 2016 that regulators still lack the necessary knowledge to regulate the
fracking industry fully and eﬀectively, and there is also growing knowledge about
serious potential threats to public health not available in 2015.
Conclusions
The ﬁfteen case studies within the REA all contained a variety of strengths and
weaknesses but provided answers, albeit sometimes only partial ones, to our
three main research questions.
1. The evidence base for robust regulation and good industry practice is cur-
rently absent. There are multiple serious challenges surrounding location,
scale, monitoring, and data deﬁcits facing regulators overseeing on-shore
UGE including fracking in the United Kingdom.
2. The evidence from peer-reviewed papers suggests fracking in the United
Kingdom will not be eﬀectively regulated. It is highly likely that regulatory
agencies may lack the staﬃng and resources necessary to monitor and
enforce eﬀective regulation of the industry.
3. The precautionary principle and prevention as keys to dealing with fracking
recur in the literature. This is underpinned by ﬁndings from the peer-
reviewed public health literature that already identify signiﬁcant hazards
and major potential risks from the industry. In the United Kingdom,
there appears to be an absence of evidence of both eﬀective prevention
and precautionary thinking in UGE laws, guidance, and policy.
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There is undoubtedly a great deal of debate about eﬀective regulations,
inspection, and enforcement. Much of the focus has been on regulating well
construction. Relatively less attention has been devoted to what goes into the
wells, comes out of the wells and is disposed of, or sealed in, when wells are
decommissioned. Figures on well failures and orphaned wells in the United
States and United Kingdom vary. In the three-year period, 2010–2012, in the
United States, 6%–7% of Pennsylvania’s 100,000 fracked well casings failed.48
Without any fracking underway in the United Kingdom, existing data relate to
other hydrocarbon wells and boreholes that do not involve the same risks as
fracked shale wells. Of the 2152 U.K. hydrocarbon wells drilled on-shore
between 1902 and 2013, there was in 2013/14 no visible evidence of 65.2% of
well sites and no monitoring was conducted. The ownership of perhaps 53%
of wells in the United Kingdom is unclear and researchers estimated between
50 and 100 were orphaned and one of 143 active U.K. wells producing at the end
of 2000 had evidence of well integrity failure.49 Such surveys and several
reviewed case studies raise signiﬁcant and as yet unanswered questions about
how wells and their related inputs and outputs can be eﬀectively regulated and
monitored during production and decades afterwards.
However, some of the primary drivers for U.K. fracking policy relate not
to scientiﬁc or legal evidence but to ideology and economic interests and is
revealed in several reports and position papers published at the request of the
Westminster government. This is a highly contested approach in the ﬁelds
of environmental and public health protection, and critics view the current
policy trajectory as highly speculative and risky. For example, the U.K. govern-
ment’s Business and Industry Ministry, along with its Better Regulation
Executive Task Force, has been keen to curtail EU regulation.50 While mention
is made of the need to protect the environment and public from shale gas
hazards, the Task Force opinions were clear. There were unnecessary proposals
in the EU to regulate shale gas extraction, and ‘‘New European legislation could
increase costs to business and threaten the exploitation of this valuable source
of energy, without oﬀering any additional environmental protection.’’
They advised
A new (Shale Gas) Directive would bring years of uncertainty, deterring investors.
Instead, guidance should be produced to clarify how existing EU environmental
regulation applies to the new possibilities of shale gas exploitation. This would
minimize scope for diﬀerences in interpretation, and enable safe and sustainable
exploitation of shale gas. 50
So despite evidence that shale gas regulation in Europe and fracking industry
practice are currently inadequate, the U.K. government was advised by the Task
Force to oppose strengthening regulation, preferring to rely on guidance. Post-
Brexit that deregulatory position may become further entrenched.
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The background too of growing concerns in the European Parliament is ger-
mane as studies reveal ‘‘existing (European) treatment plants are ill-equipped to
treat hydraulic fracturing waste water and may be discharging pollutants into
rivers and streams’’ at a time when the exact impacts of fracking were uncertain.51
Reins recognizes there are still real challenges with ‘‘the regulatory requirements
applicable to shale gas development prior to operation, the regulation of surface
water issues, the framework applicable to underground injection and ground-
water, and wastewater management.’’51 And there is a high level of uncertainty
about fracking and water regulation in the EU with a possible race to the bottom
on regulation from member states faced with minimum standards.51
Our case study assessments also conﬁrm earlier research on the subject. In
2015, some of the failures on fracking risk assessment and control came from
either poor or inadequate regulation or problems with well-construction.
However, others relate to the intrinsic nature of the industry. These factors,
including well construction and failures, were carefully and rigorously analyzed
by an environmental scientist.4 The author criticized the assumption by Public
Health England that ‘‘all reported health risks from fracking could simply be
overcome by regulation and engineering.’’ She commented:
Exposure to harmful chemicals due to fracking activity cannot be eliminated
through regulation as there are technological and economic limitations to the treat-
ment of emissions into the air, into groundwater and from waste; thus fracking is
an inherently risky process in terms of human health.4
Moreover
UK regulations claim to minimize the risks derived from fracking; however, in
England and Wales there is no set minimum distance between industrial activity
and populated areas. This ignores evidence that geographical distance is a key
variable aﬀecting cancerous and non-cancerous health eﬀects in residents near
fracking sites.4
In terms of policy conclusions linked to the application of cautious approaches,
Reap considered ‘‘. . . the safest approach with regard to public health would be
to dismiss fracking as a viable option and promote energy technologies that are
known to have less of an impact on human health.’’4
It is this kind of salutary and precautionary analysis that is largely missing
from oﬃcial- and industry-commissioned reports on UGE and fracking in the
United Kingdom. Based on our reading of the available evidence, we believe a
much more precautionary policy stance is necessary to protect public health.
Caution, with signiﬁcant margins of error built in, should underpin all rigorous
evaluations of what can and cannot be done with regard to assessing the viability
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and credibility of eﬀectively regulating, monitoring, and inspecting the U.K.
fracking industry. It may be that the public health risks and challenges presented
by the industry outweigh any beneﬁts and are beyond eﬀective regulation in
which case prevention becomes a major policy option.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conﬂicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no ﬁnancial support for the research, authorship, and/or publica-
tion of this article.
References
1. Watterson A and Dinan W. A rapid evidence assessment of regulation and regulatory
practices involved in fracking and its public health implications, October, www.reg-
ulatingscotland.org/report/frackingandregulation.pdf (2016, accessed 7 February
2017).
2. Bevan N, Connelly M, Francis J, et al. Rapid Evidence Assessment Toolkit index.
UK Government Social Research Service, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.
uk/20140305122816/http:/www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr/resources-and-gui-
dance/rapid-evidence-assessment (accessed 5 February 2017).
3. Law A, Hays J, Shonkoff S, et al. Public Health England’s draft report on shale gas
extraction. BMJ 2014; 348: 2728.
4. Reap E. The risk of hydraulic fracturing on public health in the UK and the UK’s
fracking legislation. Environ Sci Eur 2015; 27: 27.
5. Centre for Sustainable Shale Development, www.responsibleshaledevelopment.org/
who-we-are/vision/ (accessed 7 February 2017).
6. World Health Organization (WHO). Global health risks: mortality and burden of dis-
ease attributable to selected major risks. Geneva: WHO, www.who.int/healthinfo/
global_burden_disease/GlobalHealthRisks_report_full.pdf (2009, accessed 7
February 2017).
7. Straif K. The burden of occupational cancer. Occup Environ Med 2008; 65: 787–788.
8. Scottish Parliament Information Centre (SPICe). Air quality in Scotland. Edinburgh:
Scottish Parliament, www.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_
16-35_Air_Quality_in_Scotland.pdf (2016, accessed 7 February 2017).
9. KPMG. Economic impact assessment of the potential development of unconventional oil
and gas in Scotland: A report for the Scottish Government. Edinburgh: Scottish
Government, www.gov.scot/Resource/0050/00509321.pdf (2016, accessed 7
February 2017).
10. White E, Fell M and Smith L. Shale gas and fracking. London: House of Commons
Library, http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN06073
(2015, accessed 11 November 2016).
Watterson and Dinan 87
11. Health Protection Scotland. A health impact assessment of unconventional oil and gas
in Scotland, vol. 1. Glasgow: Health Protection Scotland, www.hps.scot.nhs.uk/
resourcedocument.aspx?resourceid¼3102 (2016, accessed 7 February 2017).
12. Broderick J, Anderson K, Wood R, et al. Shale gas: an updated assessment of envir-
onmental and climate change impacts. Manchester: Tyndall Centre for Climate
Change, www.mace.manchester.ac.uk/media/eps/schoolofmechanicalaerospaceand-
civilengineering/newsandevents/news/research/pdfs2011/shale-gas-threat-report.pdf
(2011, accessed 7 February 2017).
13. Tombs S. Making better regulation, making regulation better? Policy Stud 2016; 37:
332–349.
14. Watterson A and Dinan W. Health impact assessments, regulation, and the uncon-
ventional gas industry in the UK: exploiting resources, ideology, and expertise? New
Solut 2016; 25: 480–512.
15. DECC. Fracking UK shale: regulation and monitoring. Guidance on fracking: develop-
ing shale oil and gas in the UK. London: UK Government; http://m.northyorks.gov.
uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id¼32804&p¼0 (2014, accessed 7 February 2017).
16. Tombs S and Whyte D. Toxic capital everywhere: mapping the co-ordinates of regu-
latory tolerance. Soc Just 2014; 42: 28–48.
17. Tombs S and Whyte D. The myths and realities of deterrence in workplace safety
regulation. Br J Criminol 2013; 53: 746–763.
18. Tombs S. Social protection after the crisis: regulation without enforcement. Bristol:
Policy Press, 2016.
19. Fleming R and Reins L. Shale gas extraction, precaution and prevention: a conver-
sation on regulatory responses. Energy Res Soc Sci 2016; 20: 131–141.
20. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (DBEIS). Guidance on fracking:
developing shale oil and gas in the UK. London: UK Government, www.gov.uk/gov-
ernment/publications/about-shale-gas-and-hydraulic-fracturing-fracking/developing-
shale-oil-and-gas-in-the-uk (2016, updated January 2017, accessed 7 February 2017).
21. SEPA. Position statement to support the implementation of the water environment
(controlled activities) (Scotland) regulations 2011: culverting of watercourses.
Stirling: SEPA, www.sepa.org.uk/media/150919/wat_ps_06_02.pdf (2015, accessed
4 October 2016).
22. SEPA. Regulatory guidance: coal bed methane and shale gas. Stirling: SEPA, www.sepa.
org.uk/media/139706/unconventional_gas_guidance.pdf (n.d., accessed 4 October 2016).
23. SEPA. Unconventional gas and ‘fracking’ – a Scottish perspective. SEPAView, 25
March. Stirling: SEPA, www.sepaview.com/2014/03/unconventional-gas-and-frack-
ing-a-scottish-perspective-2/ (2014, accessed 7 February 2017).
24. SEPA. Agency board meeting. Stirling: SEPA 44/15, www.sepa.org.uk/media/163332/
sepa-44-15-chief-executives-report.pdf (2015, accessed 4 October 2016).
25. PR Newswire. Fracking fluid & chemicals market 2015 – global forecasts to 2020. PR
Newswire, www.prnewswire.co.uk/news-releases/fracking-fluid–chemicals-market-
2015–global-forecasts-to-2020-major-players-in-the-32-billion-industry-are-hallibur
ton-schlumberger-baker-hughes-dupont-akzonobel-basf–ashland-532080892.html
(2015, accessed 7 February 2017).
26. HSE. HSE’s role in regulating onshore shale gas and hydraulic fracturing. Bootle:
HSE, www.hse.gov.uk/shale-gas/about.htm (n.d., accessed 3 October 2016).
88 NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy 27(1)
27. HSE. Working together to regulate unconventional oil and gas developments. Bootle:
HSE, www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/howwework/framework/aa/hse-ea-oil-gas-nov12.pdf
(November 2012, accessed 3 October 2016).
28. HSE. Onshore gas and pipelines sector strategy 2014–17 strategic context. Bootle:
HSE, www.hse.gov.uk/gas/onshore-strategic-context.pdf (2014, accessed 4 October
2016).
29. HSE. Onshore gas and pipelines sector strategy 2014–17: delivering the strategy.
Bootle: HSE, www.hse.gov.uk/gas/onshore-delivering-the-strategy.pdf (2014,
accessed 4 October 2016).
30. HSE. Onshore gas and pipelines sector strategy 2014–17. Aims and objectives. HSE:
Bootle, www.hse.gov.uk/gas/onshore-aims-and-objectives.pdf (2014, accessed 4
October 2016).
31. EPA. Hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas: impacts from the hydraulic fracturing water
cycle on drinking water resources in the United States. Washington, DC: US EPA,
EPA/600/R-16/236F, https://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/hfstudy/recordisplay.cfm?deid¼332
990 (2016, accessed 7 February 2017).
32. Brownlow JW, Yelderman JC and James SC. Spatial risk analysis of hydraulic frac-
turing near abandoned and converted oil and gas wells. Groundwater. Epub ahead of
print 27 September 2016. DOI: 10.1111/gwat.12471.
33. Camarillo MK, Domen JK and Stringfellow WT. Physical-chemical evaluation of
hydraulic fracturing chemicals in the context of produced water treatment. J Environ
Manage 2016; 12: 164–174.
34. Grant C, Lutz A, Kulig A, et al. Fracked ecology: response of aquatic trophic struc-
ture and mercury biomagnification dynamics in the marcellus shale formation.
Ecotoxicology 2016; 25: 1–12.
35. Manz KE, Haerr G, Lucchesi J, et al. Adsorption of hydraulic fracturing fluid com-
ponents 2-butoxyethanol and furfural onto granular activated carbon and shale rock.
Chemosphere 2016; 164: 585–592.
36. McLaughlin M, Borch T and Blotevogel J. Spills of hydraulic fracturing chemicals on
agricultural topsoil: biodegradation, sorption, and co-contaminant interactions.
Environ Sci Technol 2016; 50: 6071–6078.
37. Yost E, Stanek J, DeWoskin R, et al. Overview of chronic oral toxicity values for
chemicals present in hydraulic fracturing fluids, flowback, and produced waters.
Environ Sci Technol 2016; 50: 4788–4797.
38. Kahrilas G, Blotevogel J, Corrin E, et al. Downhole transformation of the hydraulic
fracturing fluid biocide glutaraldehyde: implications for flowback and produced
water quality. Environ Sci Technol 2016; 50: 11414–11423.
39. Mrdjen I and Lee J. High volume hydraulic fracturing operations: potential impacts
on surface water and human health. Int J Environ Heal R 2016; 26: 361–380.
40. Balise V, Meng C, Cornelius-Green J, et al. Systematic review of the association
between oil and natural gas extraction processes and human reproduction. Fertil
Steril 2016; 106: 795–819.
41. Durant B, Abualfaraj N, Olson MS, et al. Assessing dermal exposure risk to workers
from flowback water during shale gas hydraulic fracturing activity. J Nat Gas Sci Eng
2016; 34: 969–978.
Watterson and Dinan 89
42. Furlow B. Unconventional natural gas development and respiratory health. Lancet
Respir Med 2016; 4: 778.
43. Rasmussen S, Ogburn E, McCormack M, et al. Association between unconventional
natural gas development in the marcellus shale and asthma exacerbations. JAMA
Intern Med 2016; 176: 1334–1343.
44. Rich A and Orimoloye H. Elevated atmospheric levels of benzene and benzene-
related compounds from unconventional shale extraction and processing: human
health concern for residential communities. Env Health Ins 2016; 10: 75–82.
45. Szolucha A. The human dimension of shale gas developments in Lancashire, UK:
towards a social impact assessment, www.academia.edu/29073366/The_Human_
Dimension_of_Shale_Gas_Developments_in_Lancashire_UK_Towards_a_social_
impacts_assessment (2016, accessed 7 February 2017).
46. Tustin A, Hirsch A, Rasmussen S, et al. Associations between unconventional nat-
ural gas development and nasal and sinus, migraine headache, and fatigue symptoms
in Pennsylvania. Environ Health Perspect 2016; 125: 189–197.
47. Werner A, Vink S, Watt K, et al. Environmental health impacts of unconventional
natural gas development: a review of the current strength of evidence. Sci Total
Environ 2015; 505: 1127–1141.
48. Ingraffea A. Fluid migration mechanisms due to faulty well design and/or construction: an
overview and recent experiences in the Pennsylvania Marcellus Play. PSE: Ithaca NY,
www.psehealthyenergy.org/data/PSE__Cement_Failure_Causes_and_Rate_Analaysis_
Jan_2013_Ingraffea1.pdf (2013, accessed 3 October 2016).
49. Davies R, Almond S, Ward R, et al. Oil and gas wells and their integrity: implications
for shale and unconventional resource exploitation. Marine Petrol Geol 2014; 56:
239–254.
50. Business Task Force. Cut EU red tape: report for the business task force.
London: Prime Minister’s Office and Department for Business Innovation & Skills,
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/249969/
TaskForce-report-15-October.pdf (2013, updated February 2014, accessed 7
February 2017).
51. Reins L. Water use for unconventional gas production in the European Union.
In: Ziolkowska J and Peterson J (eds) Competition for water resources: experiences
and management approaches in the US and Europe. Oxford: Elsevier, 2017,
pp.197–211.
Author Biographies
Andrew Watterson, PhD, CFIOSH, holds a professorship in health and is the
Director of the Centre for Public Health and Population Health Research
and head of the Occupational and Environmental Health Research Group,
School of Health Sciences, University of Stirling, Stirling, Scotland. His
research currently focuses on occupational and environmental health impact
assessments in a variety of sectors and participatory action research. He
works closely with communities and trade unions in the United Kingdom
and beyond.
90 NEW SOLUTIONS: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy 27(1)
William Dinan, PhD, is a lecturer in Communications, Media & Culture, School
of Arts & Humanities, University of Stirling and co-founder and director of
Spinwatch, Steering Committee Member, Alliance for Lobbying Transparency
& Ethics Regulation in Europe (ALTER EU, 2005–present). Research interests
include lobbying, spin, promotional culture, political communication, environ-
mental communication, and governance.
Watterson and Dinan 91
